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Oil fouls everything in southern Nigeria. It spills from pipelines, poisoning soil 
and water. It stains the hands of politicians and generals, who siphon-off its 
profits. It taints the ambitions of the young, who will try anything to scoop up a 
share of the liquid riches – fire a gun, sabotage a pipeline, (and) kidnap a 
foreigner. (Tom O’Neill, 2007). 
Key words: Nigeria, global economic crisis 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Nigeria is one of the world’s resource rich economies most at risk from 
the current economic crisis. A poor African nation blessed with enormous wealth, 
beset with lack of leadership, poor institutions and contradictory visions of 
prosperity since oil first gushed from the marshy ground of the Niger Delta in 
1956. The Nigerian crude oil described as a “sweet”, low-sulphur liquid called 
Bonny Light pumped petrodollars into the nation’s confers that by the mid-1970s, 
the country had joined the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(O’Neill, 2007). Why Nigeria is at risk from the current economic crisis and what 
may be done to ameliorate it? This paper sets out to provide further evidence 
following the framework by Fosu and Naude (2009) which posits that recovery 
measures should among other recognise the role of good governance and a 
‘syndrome free’ policy environment. Syndrome free policy environment 
according to Fosu and O’Connell (2006) is a policy trust that is largely free from 
anti-growth or precarious adverse effects of various policy combination, such as; 
state controls (direct and indirect controls of prices, state production and 
distribution), redistribution of resources to cronies in favour of regional 
constituencies, ethnicity and polarization of the citizenry. Other anti-growth 
polices are suboptimal intertemporal allocation; bloated public spending above 
inter-temporal optimal allocation of resources which could aggravate a ‘bust’ and 
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state breakdown, a situation that may lead to violent conflict, such as arm 
struggle, arm conflict, civil war or a coup d’état, resulting to a breakdown of law. 
The presence or occurrence of these four canons of policy syndromes as 
hypothesized could retard per capita GDP growth and reverse the marginal gains 
recorded in recent years from high commodity prices (oil export revenue).  
 Indeed the sustainability of the gains has been threatened since the 
global economic crisis and the tumble-down of commodity prices. As such 
pitfalls like inflation, boom-bust growth, policy summersault, corruption and 
inept leadership should be avoided. This may position the Nigerian economy in 
the cushioning of the current and future global crisis. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Following the introduction 
in section 1, a review of some salient causes of the global economic crisis is 
epilogued briefly in section 2. In section 3 an overview of the Nigerian economy 
and the global financial crisis shock is x-rayed. Then in section 4 we examine 
how resilient the Nigerian economy is vis-à-vis the four canons of policy 
syndromes. Emphasis on good governance is equally discussed. In section 5 some 
policy responses by various institutions including the Nigerian government will 
be examined. Section 6 concludes the paper with some remarks. 
 
 
2. CAUSES OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 The global economic crisis which started initially as a financial crisis in 
2007 is now a global phenomenon and no country seemed to have been spared. 
The global economic crisis may still be far from over although some signs of 
recovery are in words being recorded in the United States of America that spread 
the financial virus, the reality still swings. What explanations can be offered for 
the crisis? This section modestly addresses the why(s) though not exhaustively. 
 The global economic crisis as earlier noted was triggered as a liquidity 
distress in August 2007 by the U.S. subprime crisis and the explanations so far 
offered according to Reddy (2009) which go beyond the U.S. subprime can be 
divided into two. On the one hand are macro-economic management and other 
hand are financial market behaviour. These could have reinforced each other. 
 
2.1 Macro-economic and Management Explanations 
 First is market imbalances created particularly by the U.S. whose large 
current account deficits accumulated over the years. The other sword was the 
significant current account surpluses by some countries (China and India, 
notably) which built over the years. The surplus current account nations, lent to 
and invested in the U.S. and as the market imbalances persisted and increased, the 
markets dynamics moved for corrections. 
 Second is the deficiency in aggregate demand coupled with excessive 
financialisation of the economy and excessive leverage1 (Reddy, 2009). During 
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the years of economic expansion in the U.S., the profits pushed investors to find 
investments that would generate higher rates of return; inevitably using money to 
go after higher-risk projects. Precisely, subprime mortgages in the U.S. reset 
higher interest rates and this began to trigger residential defaults. Holders of 
mortgage-backed securities started to hoard cash to rebalance their asset balance 
sheets (Stratfor, 2009). Consequently, banks in the U.S., Europe and Asia 
severely restricted lending in order to shore up their cash reserves. This action led 
to a reduction in the amount of credit available to everyone globally. 
 Third, the large domestic savings in some countries such as China, India, 
etc; that could not be fully channelled into the required domestic investments due 
to the underdeveloped nature of their financial markets. 
 Fourth, multilateral institutions like the IMF, which were saddled with 
the responsibility of surveillance, failed to bring out the extent of vulnerabilities 
of some powerful countries who dominated it. Those countries were equally not 
willing to subject their economies to objective surveillance as they influenced the 
institutions’ operations towards excessive market-oriented ideology. 
 Sixth, the excessive accommodation nature of the U.S. monetary policy 
which allowed increased money supply accompanied by low interest rates. The 
excess liquidity found its way into speculative activities as investors went in 
search of high yield ventures and under-price risks. This caused the asset bubbles 
that eventually bust. 
 Seventh, failure of some central banks (CBs) to act against dictate of the 
markets. The perceived under-pricing of risks was bashed with assertions that the 
CBs could not sit in judgement on prices set by market forces. Proponents of this 
view assured policy markers that the markets would correct themselves 
automatically. In addition, the CBs ignored the economic imbalances and asset 
bubbles that were building up and concentrated exclusively on price stability (in 
some cases inflation targeting) and provided forward guidance to financial 
markets in the name of transparency. 
 Finally, the over-dependence of the global economy on one reserve 
currency – the U.S. dollar, as the universal measurement and expression of value. 
This made the global economic system to be subjected to the policy failures of the 
U.S. 
 
2.2 Financial Sector Regulation 
 The second strand of explanations relate to the functioning of the 
regulatory environment of financial markets. The explanations so far canvassed 
are summarised in this sub-section. 
 First, the variety and complexities of market innovations overwhelmed 
the skills possessed by regulators in the financial sectors. 
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 Second, regulators had a narrow perception of the systemic risks that the 
individual – regulated institutions operated. The regulatory institutions did not 
recognise the need for counter-cyclicality2 in regulation. Thus, they amplified the 
boom and bust cycle. 
 Third, non-bank entities such as investment banks, hedge funds, private 
equity firms were outside the focus of regulators. Thus, the regulators 
concentrated their efforts and resources on regulating commercial banks. 
 Four, in the implementation of Basel 2, the regulators over-relied on the 
ratings assigned by Credit Rating Agencies. The ratings were eventually found to 
be unreliable. 
 Fifth, cross-border institutions’ regulation and supervision was weak, 
despite the understanding that the financial markets were globalised. 
 Sixth, the greed to develop global financial centres made London and 
New York to adopt ‘light touch regulation’ or minimal regulation. 
 A critical review of the above explanations may make one erroneously 
conclude that they relate more to the US and the UK. So why and how did the 
problem become a global crisis? 
 
2.3 The Synergy 
 The crisis obviously is a failure of both the market and the state-: failure 
of governance in both private and public sectors. Significant political economy 
factors drove the inactions and inept of the CBs and governments. These were 
excessive accommodative monetary policy which was accompanied by greedy 
and soft regulation in many economies. As observed in Reddy (2009”347), a 
cynic had remarked that under socialism, the governments took over the banks, 
and under capitalism banks took over the governments. 
 The failure of the market system and governments at all levels was a 
failure of the entire economic system. The free market system had a companion – 
capitalism, and propaganda machine – democracy. The engine of spread is 
globalisation driven by liberalization and information technology.  “The Fallacy 
of Aggregation”, according to Bhagwati (2000:19 and 20) made: 
 People think of globalization as a great big blob. They do not distinguish 
between the different dimensions on which you globalize, but just assume that 
everything goes together. If you are a free trader you must be for free 
immigration, you must be for free capital flows, you must be for free foreign 
investment, you must be for free love, you must be for free everything”. These 
are dangerous for poor and developing economies. 
 In all of the above there is merit in asking the question; what does the 
global crisis and its implications have for Nigeria? Frankly, Nigeria like other 
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African nations is innocent of this crisis and did not contribute to the imbalances. 
So how did Nigeria get caught-up? 
 As earlier noted the bubble bust in sub-prime mortgages in the U.S. and 
was transmitted to the credit markets. The deep integration of domestic financial 
markets in Nigeria with global financial institutions; and some of the financial 
instruments which later proved toxic in the derivative markets were distributed 
across several economies. Thus, there was a global spread of the contagion of 
distress and Nigeria was not spared. This cup must pass by! 
 
 
3. BRIEF PROFILE OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY IN 
 RECENT YEARS 
 Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country with over 140 million people. 
In 1960, agricultural products such as groundnut, palm oil and cacao beans made 
up nearly all Nigeria’s exports. Today, Nigeria is show-cased as Africa’s highest 
oil exporting nation, yet quality of life rates below all other major oil exporting 
nations; from Libya to Indonesia (O’Neill, 2007). Oil accounts for 95 percent of 
Nigeria’s export earnings and 80 percent of its revenue. The country hosts one of 
the world’s largest wetlands – the delta (Niger Delta) where the oil is deposited. 
The features of the Niger Delta are horrible tales. They are characterised by 
decades of oil spills, acid rains from gas flares, and the stripping away of the 
mangroves swamp forest for oil pipelines. These are some causes of the sense of 
relentless crisis that has deepened in the region. In recent times, there have been 
intensified attacks on oil platforms and pumping stations. Militants in the region 
who prime themselves as freedom fighters have killed soldiers and security 
guards, kidnapped oil workers (citizens and foreigners), short down daily flow of 
more than 500,000 barrels of oil. Effective from July 8th – 5th October, 2009, the 
federal government extended an olive branch in form of amnesty to the militants 
in the region; after using the Nigerian armed forces to destroy the oil producing 
villages in the region more recently among them is Gbaramatu (a suspected 
hideout for the militants). In all of these, the World Bank’s categorization of 
Nigeria as “fragile state”, beset by risk of armed conflict, epidemic disease, and 
failed government (O’Neill, 2007) is still reminiscent and nostalgic. 
 
3.1 Emerging Facts from the Economy before and during the 
 Global Economic Crisis 
 Real GDP growth increased from 6.2% in 2007 to an estimated 6.8% in 
2008 with non-oil sectoral growth at 9.5%, while the oil sector declined 
by 4.5%. 
 GDP in absolute terms stood at an estimated US $179.7 billion in 2008, 
while GDP per capita was US $1228.3 billion during the same year. 
However, in mid-2009, the GDP growth rate of 6.8% recorded in 2008 
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dropped to 4.85%. It is expected that this may rise further given 
improvement in price of crude oil ($72.52 on 20 August, 2009) and the 
relative peace expected in the Niger Delta region. 
 Stock market capitalisation fell by 46% over 2008, and All Share Index 
lost a total of 67% from March 2008 to March 2009. It further declined 
to 58.68% at September 4, 2009. 
 Moving to domestic bank lending, there seems to be evidence of 
increased tightening credit conditions. Prime lending rate increased to 
18.16% in half year of 2009 from 17.52% average in 2008. The ratio of 
NPLs (none performing loans) which fell to 8.44% from 18.12% in 
2005, increased to 28% in 2008. Still net domestic credit tends to be on 
the increase. 
 There is evidence of foreign portfolio withdrawals as total financial 
inflows in Nigeria exhibits. Between 2007 and 2008, total financial 
inflow increased by 21% from US $95,900 million to US $115,777. It is 
predicted that FDI inflows may reduce as evidenced by mid-2009 record 
total of financial inflows to the tune of US $71,133. 
 Capitalised value of quoted banks has been on the decline since the crisis 
started. From the activity indicator, for instance, banking index 
depreciated 14.33% to close in the week ending 21/08/09 at 237.91 
points. In the preceding week, the banking index depreciated by 7.02%. 
In addition, the heed to liberalisation, deregulation and integration with 
world markets, the Nigerian markets may be destabilised further. 
According to Ajakaiye and Fakiyesi (2009), the capital market has been 
shrinking; major international ledge funds have been withdrawn and 
international credit line fast fading out of loanable funds for the private 
sector. 
 Exports from Nigeria rose by 23.5% in 2008 to an estimated US $76.3 
billion from US $61.8 billion in 2007; higher prices of oil exports 
accounted for this. 
 Imports to Nigeria increased by 15.7% to an estimated US $44.9 billion 
in 2008 from US $38.8 billion in 2007.This is due to the fact that 
Nigerian economy is import dependent and influenced by high import 
revenue. 
 In 2008, a trade surplus of over 36.5% growth was recorded to US $31.4 
billion from US $23 billion in 2007. 
 External reserves grew by 16.4% from US $51.3 billion in 2007 to an 
estimated US $59.7 billion in 2008. The Nigerian government has been 
steadily amassing its reserves since 2003 due to improved terms of trade 
and greater commitment to saving oil windfall against rainy days. It is 
expected by end of 2009, external reserves could increase since price of 
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oil has been hovering above $60 per barrel; and the 2009 budget hinged 
on $45 per barrel. 
 The official exchange rate between the Nigerian naira and the United 
States dollar has been a matter of concern. The rate has been 
depreciating since the crisis started. Improved external trade saw the 
exchange rate average N119.28/US$1 in 2008 from the previous year 
average of N125.81/US$1 in 2007. The rate has however depreciated 
further to N156.12/US$1 since June, 2009. 
 The inflation estimate for 2005 was 17.9%. This rate was higher than 
one digit rate of 2006 (8.59) and 2007 (9.80). Owing to commodity price 
boom, inflation rate rose strongly as Nigeria started experiencing a two-
digit inflation rate from the third quarter of 2008. To be precise average 
inflation rate recorded at end of 2008 stood at 11.5%. Should prices of 
exportable decline, inflationary pressures should subside. The inflation 
rate so far recorded in half year of 2009 stand at 11.10%. 
 Remittances in recent times have become a major source of external 
financing for many Africa low-income countries (including Nigeria) thus 
it is important to monitor its trend. Data from the World Bank suggest 
that in 2007, remittances represent a fair sizeable component of 
economy; accounting for over 6% of GDP. As observed by te Velde, et. 
al. (2009:15); remittance inflow into Nigeria experienced a decline in the 
last quarter of 2008. 
 Revenue from export of commodities is recognised as one main driver of 
growth in the African continent. Strong growths recorded in the 
industrialized countries of China and India is one factor of importance 
that led to increased demand and commodity prices.  Nigeria benefited 
much from the increased commodity prices. One of the benefits was the 
country’s external debt repayments especially to the Paris Club. In 
addition, most of the revenue (foreign exchange earnings) that led to 
Nigeria’s increased external reserves is credited to improved trade prices 
and not trade volumes. Nigeria as mono-export (crude oil) dependent 
economy is susceptible to shocks in the movements of such a 
commodity price. This is why the reality of the global recession is 
beginning to be fully appreciated in Nigeria. The sharp decline in the 
international price of crude oil from the unprecedented amount of US 
$147/barrel in July 2008 to about $50/barrel in January, 2009 is 
worrisome. Although some improvements are being recorded due to the 
response of the U.S. economy to its bail-out programmes, overcoming 
the recession/crisis the advanced economies is in one way a bail-out on 
its own of the Nigeria economy. It is interesting to note that the price of 
crude oil has hovered above US $65 as the market entered August, 2009 
on a bullish note. 
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 Nigeria debt profile decreased to US $17,349.69 billion in 2006 from US 
$46,259.45 billion in 2004. This was due to the repayment of the 
substantial amount owed by the country to the Paris Club. In 2007 and 
2008, the debt profile again increased to US $22,229.88 billion and US 
$23,383.98 billion respectively. Domestic debt share accounted for over 
84% of the total. The debt profile might increase further in 2009 since 
the government is funding the 2009 fiscal budget through loans 
(domestic/external). The information in Table 1 highlights the downturn 
of the global economic and financial crisis that has been continuously 
transmitted across all sectors through both trade and financial channels 
into the Nigerian economy. 
Table 1  
Nigeria Key indicators, 2004-2009 (half year) 
Indicators 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 HY 
GDP at market prices (N 
billions) 9,575 13,557 16,187 17,822 21,440  NA 
Real GDP growth (%) 6.4 6.5 6.0 6.2 6.8  4.85 
Oil Sector GDP growth 
rate (%) 3.30 0.50 -4.51 -5.1 -5.1  NA 
Non-oil Sector GDP 
growth rate (%) 7.82 8.60 8.59 9.80 9.67  NA 
Consumer Price Inflation 
(av., %) 15.00 17.90 8.20 5.40 11.50 11.10 
External Debt Stock (US$ 
billions) 35.94 21.22 3.54 3.397 3.397  NA 
Interest Paid on External 
debts (N Billions) 193.70 193.70 122.11 66.00 66.00*  NA 
Domestic Debt Stock (N 
Trillions)  1.37 1.53 1.80 2.15 2.15  NA 
Interest Paid on Domestic 
debts (N Billions)  203.60 200.30 212.00 306.20 306.20  NA 
External Reserves (US$ 
Billions) 16.96 28.28 42.30 51.33 59.69  43.46 
Credit to the Private Sector 
(N Billions) 1,507.89 1,950.38 2,490.38 5,042.30 6763.8  8,556.94 
Net Domestic Credit (N 
Billions) 2,020.17 2,313.39 753.81 2,212.67 3,701.30 5,677.16 
Population (millions) 134.60 137.50 140.40 143.30 146.30 147.80 
Total Financial Inflow 
(US$ million)  NA NA NA 95,900.00 
115,777.0
0 71,133.00 
Remittance Inflows (US$ 
million) 2,273.00 3,329.00 5,435.00 9,221.00  9,979.00  NA 
Unemployment Rate (%)  11.80 11.90 5.30 5.80 11.80  NA 
Banks Total Assets (N 
Billions)  3,392.90 4,389.30 6,738.00 10,431.00 10,156.40  NA 
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Banks NPLS (% of Total 
Credit) 21.6 18.12 8.76 8.44 28  NA 
Total Banks Deposits (N 
Billions) 1,623 2,478 3,441 5,358 5,358  693.90 
 
Indicators 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 HY 
Appreiation 
(Depreciation), N/US$ (%) 3.03 2.90 1.57 8.03 0.15  NA 
Exchange Rate (av., 
N:US$) Local Currency is 
Naira 
132.89 131.27 128.65 125.81 119.28 156.12 
Time Deposit (Over 12 
months) (%)  12.71 6.10 9.88 9.64 10.33 13.06 
Prime Lending Rate (%)  18.91 17.80 17.76 17.60 17.52 18.16 
MPR (%) 15.00 13.00 10.00 9.50 10.25  8.00 
NSE all share index 
growth rate (%) N 18.46 1.01 37.80 74.73 - 3.52 -57.10 
NSE all share index 
growth rate (%) US$ 21.49 3.91 39.35 82.76 3.37  NA 
Year End Market Cap US$ 
(billions) 16.00 22.00 36.00 105.00  80.00  NA 
91-day T-bill rate (year 
end) (%) 14.50 11.89 7.25 8.50 9.25  4.70 
182-day T-bill rate (year 
end) (%) 16.00 14.50 9.99 8.75 9.54 5.40 
365-day T-bill rate (year 
end) (%)  N/A 17.00 9.23 7.93 9.20 5.60 
Exports fob (US$ 
millions) 36,890 50,162 59,144 61,800 76,277  NA 
Imports fob (US$ 
millions) 19,442 25,639 31,113 38,787 44,880  NA 
Current Account Balance 
(US$ millions) 4,319 8,021 13,796 2,197 4,771  NA 
Sources: (a) World Bank (March 2009 revision)  
 (b) CBN (2006, 2008)  
 (c) http://www.gnexid.org/country/Nigeria.pdf [17-08-09] 
 (d) www.dmo.gove.ng/documents/debtprofils/external. 
 
 
4. NIGERIA’S RESILIENT: THE FOUR CANONS OF 
POLICY SYNDROME AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 In the wake of global financial crisis in 2007 presumably triggered by 
the sub-prime crisis, the Nigerian economy recorded excellent economic growth 
precisely before July 2008. The drivers of this strong growth (averaging over 6 
percent annually) among others were global high demand for crude oil whose 
price rose unprecedentedly among other commodities, rising capital inflows etc. 
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At the moment the recession that the global economy plugged into is yet to be 
over. This section of the paper discusses the weight of vulnerability of the 
Nigerian economy against its resilience using four canons of policy syndromes 
and governance that are detrimental to growth. These canons are (a la Fosu, 
2009b); state controls, adverse redistribution, suboptimal inter-temporal 
resource allocation and state breakdown/failure. 
 
4.1. State Controls 
 A country is classified as having ‘state controls’ if in a given year, the 
government heavily distorts major economic fundamentals (labour, finance, 
domestic and international trade, and production). In recent years before the 
global economic crisis, the Nigerian economy though was not fully integrated 
with world markets, it pushed further into liberalisation, privatisation of state own 
corporations and integration of its financial markets. This is at variance with pre-
1986 structural adjustment programmes when government policy and operation 
was more of socialist orientation. Thus most policies since 1986 and more 
recently favoured inward-looking, state-led development strategy and 
deregulation. Notable examples are the N25 billion Commercial banks 
recapitalisation, National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy 
(NEEDS), Vision 2020, 7-point Agenda etc. Some of these strategies induced the 
use of state controls that may be detrimental to productivity growth. 
 
4.2. Adverse Redistribution 
 This is a situation where redistributive policies favour constituencies of 
respective government leaders, usually regional, ethnic undertones etc. It is 
expected that such policies would breed inefficient resource allocation by 
misallocating public investments. Many examples exist in Nigeria since the 
current administration first under the leadership of Late Alhaji Umaru Musa 
Yar’Adua came into power in August 2007. The President and Commander-in-
Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces, Alhaji Musa Yar’Adua hails from the 
Northern part of Nigeria, dominated by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic nationality. The 
regime has been accused of northernising the Nigeria federation that is made up 
of over 50 ethnic groups, mostly concentrated in southern Nigeria. This 
accusation follows the heel of appointments of only Hausa-Fulanis into 
influential positions in the administration of Nigeria like the Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Economic Planning, Ministry of Petroleum Resources, and Governor 
of the Central Bank of Nigeria etc. 
 These appointments have also led to the sitting of a Petroleum 
Management Institute in Kaduna in the Northern part of Nigeria with a take-off 
grant of N25 billion. Crude oil deposits and the main driver of the Nigerian 
economic growth are in the south-south of the country. Whereas, the University 
of Petroleum Resources in Effurun in south-south of Nigeria (established in 2006) 
is underfunded. In addition, the current reforms being pursued by the Central 
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bank Governor has been perceived in some quarters as a northern agenda and his 
experience and tenacity has been questioned. 
 The establishment of the Petroleum Management Institute in Kaduna is 
seen as a duplication and waste of scarce resources, given that a Petroleum 
Training Institute and a University of Petroleum Resources already exist in the 
south prior to its establishment. From all indications, the establishment of the 
Petroleum Management Institute in Kaduna does not have any economic value as 
the resources for its establishment could have be channelled into more productive 
sectors like power and energy that have beset the development of the Nigerian 
economy. Moreover, adverse redistribution syndrome could also result from 
downright looting such as the regime of Nigerian head of state; Gen. Sanni 
Abacha (1993-98) and in recent times, some former state governors of Bayelsa 
and Plateau among others in the third republic.  
 
4.3. Suboptimal Inter-temporal Resource Allocation (SIRA) 
 SIRA is a syndrome of revenue misallocation over time. It amounts to 
over spreading in commodity booms and insufficient expenditure during 
subsequent bust (Fosu, 2008, 2009b). Some number of projects undertaken in 
Nigeria have no economic justifications (e.g. FESTAC ’77) by the Olusegun 
Obasanjo regime in 1977 (first coming), the National Identity Card saga in 2005 
by Olusegun Obasanjo (second coming) among others. Series projects especially 
at the state levels are abandoned due to fiscal difficulties when the booms ended 
(example is the Warri Cosmopolitan Water Project), the federal railway project 
from Itakpe in Kogi state to Ovwian-Aladja Steel Plant in Delta state, etc. Such 
misallocation and waste of resources can deter economic growth. 
 
4.4. State Breakdown/Failure 
 State breakdown refers to open warfare, such as civil wars, arm struggle, 
militias, coup d’état that can results in instability of breakdown of law and order 
(see Fosu and O’Connell, 2006 and Fosu, 2009b). State breakdown could also 
results to human suffering, interrupts production and distribution as well as 
inefficient allocation of resources from the social sector into non-productive 
military sector. Example is the relentless crisis in the Niger Delta (South of 
Nigeria) since 2006, when a secretive group of armed militants under the name of 
Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), intensified attacks on 
oil platforms and pumping stations, most operated by Shell Nigeria, Chevron etc. 
The attacks led to shut down of daily flow of more than 1,000,000 barrels of oil, 
lost of revenue, lives (civilians and foreigners). With each disruption, the daily 
price of oil on the world market climbed (O’Neill, 2007). Other than the lost of 
revenue, the Nigeria government mobilised the Nigeria Armed Forces for 
counter-insurgence and security. Billions of US$ were allocated for the 
operations, spent and the amount shrewd in secrecy without accountability in the 
name of security votes.  
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The recourse to military resource allocation from productive and social 
sector no doubt reduces investment as well. The public universities in Nigeria 
have been on a nation-wide strike due to poor conditions of service. Resources 
spent on the military as a result of the crisis in the Niger Delta are enough to 
enhance the education sector and sustain it for almost a decade. 
 Although a bust period was attained and experienced in the last three 
years, there was no output or production growth of crude oil due to the disruption 
caused by the militants. The militant arm-struggle was due to a long period of 
neglect in the development of the region that hosts the crude oil deposits. The 
environmental degradation caused by oil exploitation and gas flaring made 
fishing and farming (the main occupation of the people in the Niger Delta) 
difficult and unproductive. Revenue derived from the region was rather used for 
the development of other regions. This inequity is a mismatch and misallocation 
of resources. The entire country still suffers from poor infrastructure and even 
worst in the region where oil is produced. The huge amount now being spent on 
security is incongruent with economic growth and a characteristic of poor state 
leadership that is inept in policy design. This can result to diminishing factor 
productivity as the Nigerian experience is. 
 
4.5. The Syndrome-free Regime 
 A syndrome-free year in a country is the year when none of the above 
syndromes is experienced. The regime of the year as reiterated by Fosu and 
O’Connell (2006), experiences a combination of political stability and a 
convincing market-friendly policies.  Nigeria in the last five years seemed to have 
been characterised by dominance of the syndromes; with little reversals. This 
little due to market-oriented reforms may have accounted for the phenomenal 
economic growth rate of over 6% in the past five years. What this holds is that the 
country would have done better should these syndromes be absent. An argument 
that has not been amplified in the literature, though recognised in the literature is 
the role of good governance in the sustenance of a ‘syndrome-free’ (SF) regime. 
The next subsection evaluates this. 
 
4.6. Good Governance 
 Good governance is evident in improved political governance (a 
measure of executive constraint). Good governance besets the absence of the 
syndromes, thus able to combine political stability with people-friendly policies. 
Some measures that can be used to measure good governance are democracy 
ranking, political system (political rights, civil liberties etc), gender equality, 
economy, knowledge, health and environmental sustainability. Interestingly, 
Campbell and Polzlbauer (2009) ranked 103 countries on their quality of 
democracy using the disaggregated instruments mentioned earlier. 
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 Nigeria is one of the 13 countries ranked. On democracy, Nigeria scored 
26.46 points over 100 point continum in 2002 – 2003 and ranked 100th. The total 
score obtained in 2005 – 2006 was 29.59 and ranked 102th gaining 3.1 points 
comparatively. The conclusions to be deduced by these performances are (i) 
Nigeria falls within the lowest third of all countries in terms of total scores; (ii) In 
terms of rank, Nigeria is among the 10 worst countries, and (iii) Nigeria since 
2002 to 2006 had a margin gain of 3.1 points in democracy score. 
 Next, political systems which encompass political rights and civil 
liberties. The political system score of Nigeria in 2002 – 2003 was 26.52 over a 
scale of 100 points. This increased to 32.35 points in 2005 – 2006. Though 
Nigeria recorded a gain of 5.83 points, the country falls within the lowest third of 
all countries. Nigeria equally recorded red in the measure of gender equality 
scores, having pooled 24.22 points in 2002 – 2003 and 24.59 points in 2005 – 
2006. The marginal gain of 0.37 point did not improve its ranking position of 
third worst country.  
 Let us consider the economy and knowledge scores of Nigeria as both 
measures are thought to reinforce each other or best, knowledge drives economy. 
Nigeria pooled 14.65 points and 15.28 points in 2002 – 2003 and 2005 – 2006 
respectively in economy scores, ranked the seventh worst. For knowledge scores, 
Nigeria recorded 14.55 points and 15.36 points in 2002 – 2003 and 2005 – 2006 
respectively. Using both instruments to evaluate, Nigeria is within the worst third 
of all countries. 
 On health performance, Nigeria lost 0.34 points, having scored a total of 
18.82 points and 18.48 points in 2002 – 2003 and 2005 – 2006 respectively. This 
abysmal performance appropriately grouped the country within the lowest third of 
all countries and ranked worst sixth. 
 Environmental sustainability scores of Nigeria looked impressive from 
the points – 59.81 and 60.46 in 2002 – 2003 and 2005 – 2006 respectively. 
However when analysed critically, especially in relation to other countries in the 
African continent, the rank of 17th worst country not only places the country 
within the lowest third of all countries, the performance is unprintable. Other than 
Peru that ranked 10th in the highest third of all countries, the first fifteen countries 
are African countries. This may not be unconnected with the level of 
industrialisation, as other advanced countries fell within the medium third. 
 If the instruments evaluated above are used as measures of democracy 
quality and good governance, then it may be concluded that the poor quality of 
governance would have had negative effect on the prevalence of growth in 
Nigeria. Consequently, the vulnerability of Nigeria vis-a-vis some relevant 
absence of syndrome-free regimes put together make the country less resilient to 
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5. POLICY MEASURES AND RESPONSES 
 The above analysis implies that Nigeria is still vulnerable and its 
resilience has marginally improved. The advanced economies have taken some 
bold steps in terms of mobilizing funds to get their economics back on the growth 
path. The African continent is equally not left out in policy responses to the 
global economic crisis. Nigeria as a country has equally taken some measures. 
The following sub-sections do the discussions. 
 
5.1. Agenda so far for Reforms to Stem Future Threats to 
 Financial Stability 
 Extensively at the global level, multilateral institutions like the UN, 
World Bank, IMF, regional development banks, OECD, ILO etc have reported on 
the impact, implications, responses required and perceived appropriate reforms 
needed. These bodies and some national authorities particularly the US, the UK 
and the Euro areas have equally made extensive efforts at constituting Ad hoc 
groups to advice on the exit way. Of interest is the comprehensive report of the 
Commission of Experts of the President of General Assembly on Reforms of 
International Monetary and Financial System. The report has the added benefits 
of inputs from member countries of the UN, while the Commission is made up of 
representation from policy makers and academics from different parts of the 
world (Reedy, 2009). 
 According to Bergsten (2009), some countries like China and the United 
States, have adopted sizable fiscal and monetary stimulus programs that will be 
extremely helpful. Others, including most of Europe and some of the emerging-
market economies, have done relatively little. With private financial markets still 
largely frozen and consumer confidence at record lows, ambitious new 
government stimulus will be the only way to restore adequate growth of demand 
in the world economy for the foreseeable future. To date, the G-20 countries have 
adopted stimulus programs amounting to 1.4 – 1.7 percent of their aggregate 
GDP (see Table 2). No more than half a dozen of them have adopted expansions 
equalling two percent of their economies, which has been the notional 
international target advanced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
others to this point. There is no doubt that the global economic and financial 
crisis requires a global policy response. 
 
5.2. Africa’s Policy Response 
 Africa’s policy response as observed by Fosu and Naude (2009) should 
focus on (i) mitigation, (ii) coping and (iii) risk reduction within the context of 
each individual country, given that circumstances of each country differs. The 
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5.3. Nigeria’s Policy Response 
 The impact and nature of the global crisis as now recognised is 
frustrating and risk the growth and development of Nigerian economy. However, 
this crisis like other global crises of the past is not insurmountable. In the last 
months, some policy measures have been taken. Some of the measures are 
discussed under mitigation, coping and risk reduction strategies as highlighted in 
Fosu and Naude (2009) propositions. 
Table 2  
Estimates of Fiscal Stimulus in 2009, Percent of GDP 
Country IMF JP Morgan IMF- JP Morgan 
JP Morgan as 
Percent of IMF 
Argentina 1.3 0.5 0.8 38 
Australia 0.8 2.4 -1.6 300 
Brazil 0.3 0.3 0 100 
Canada 1.5 1.1 0.4 73 
China 2 2.1 -0.1 105 
France 0.7 1 -0.3 143 
Germany 1.5 1.3 0.2 87 
India 0.5 5 -0.4 1000 
Indonesia 1.3 0 1.3 0 
Italy 0.2 0.1 0.1 50 
Japan 1.4 2 -0.6 143 
Korea 1.5 1.1 0.4 73 
Mexico 1 1.4 -0.4 140 
Russia 1.7 1.1 0.6 65 
Saudi Arabia 3.3 NA NA NA 
South Africa 1.3 1.6 -0.3 123 
Spain 1.1 1.9 -0.8 173 
Turkey 0 0 0 NA 
United Kingdom 1.4 1.6 -0.2 114 












US$ 1.4 1.7 -0.2 115 
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 Mitigation Action 
 Mitigation actions tend towards restoring financial confidence, expand 
trade and finance. Under this action, the Central Bank of Nigeria has improved on 
its monitoring and supervision operations in order to strengthen the banking 
sector. In one swoop in August 2009, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) sacked 
the entire management including managing directors and chief executives of five 
banks for mismanagement and granting of loans without adequate collateral. The 
Central Bank of Nigeria equally injected the sum of N410 billion (US$2.7 billion) 
into these banks to avert presumed collapse. Efforts are also being put in place by 
the CBN to introduce Islamic Banking. In addition, the expanded discount 
window facility to banks stood at N275 billion in early 2009 down from N1 
trillion as banks repay the temporary loans. These are just some measures taken in 
the finance sector. The capital market is not left out also. For example, the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange de-listed 19 stagnant companies, while the Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has released new guidelines/rules on market 
makers.  SEC has also introduced a limit of 15% on share buyback. 
On expansion of trade, this may be a little difficult since the Nigeria 
economy is import dependent and mono-export (oil) economy. It is expected that 
economic recovery in the US, the major importer of Nigeria’s crude oil may rob-
off on the country. 
 Coping Action 
 The Central Bank of Nigeria proposed on January 21, 2009 to spend 3 
trillion naira (US$20 billion) of the country’s reserves. Since then there has been 
a draw down on the external reserves in order to cope with declining foreign 
exchange reserve. See Table 1 for more information. Equally as a coping action, 
militants in the Niger Delta have been given amnesty. The amnesty offer lapses 
on October 4, 2009 for disarmament. A resettlement programme has also been put 
in place. 
 Risk Reduction Strategies 
 The Nigerian government is still continuing with the power sector 
projects aimed at achieving 6000mw and 10,000mw power generation target in 
December 2009 and 2010 respectively. This is expected to reduce the cost of 
production and improve the living standards of Nigerians and all efforts are being 
put in place to fund the projects. On social cohesion, efforts have been put in 
place to promote peace across the country and project nation building through the 
rebranding programme of the government. 
There are some improvement in contract enforcement, however much is still 
needed on the rule of law and ensuring that striking public universities teachers 
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Table 3  
Policy responses to the global economic crisis in Africa 
Objectives Action 
 MITIGATION ACTION 
Restore financial 
confidence 
• Monitoring, supervision and regulation of   financial institutions 
• Recapitalization of banks where needed 
Expand trade 
• Avoid protectionism 
• Maintain competitive exchange rate policies 
• Obtain balance-of-payments support 
• Obtain trade finance support 





• Increase aid and accelerate aid disbursement 
• Attract FDI 
• Facilitate remittances 
• Stop and return illicit funds/flight capital 
COPING ACTION 
Expand domestic demand 
• Undertake public works programmes 
• Prevent unemployment escalating 
• Provide social security, e.g., cash transfers, school feeding           
programmes 
• Consider tax reductions 
Absorb financial losses • Draw down reserves and utilize short-term international financial assistance 
Expand self-employment • Relax business regulations 
Technical assistance 
• Obtain assistance in planning and coordinating responses 
• Ensure the targeting and distribution of assistance 





• Monitor violent conflict 
• Address grievances 
• Contain violence and spillovers 
• Plan for displacements and migrations 
RISK REDUCTION 
STRATEGIES 
Export and production 
diversification 
• Expand south-south trade 
• Promote manufacturing (e.g., through agro-industries) 
• Promote tourism 
• Invest in infrastructure 
Banking system strengthen 
and financial deepening 
• Expand access to finance 
• Encourage financial innovation 
• Maintain adequate bank capital requirements 
• Encourage domestic banking expansion 
Social cohesion 
• End conflicts/promote peace 
• Participatory and inclusive governance 
• Protect minorities 
• Nation-building 
Good governance and 
institutional development 
• Build strong and effective government 
• Strengthen basic institutions, i.e., property rights, rule of law, 
contract enforcement, independent judiciary 
Reform of international 
financial architecture 
• Give greater voice to SSA 
• Advance the Doha Round, with more development content 
• Reform Bretton Woods 
• More development role for G-20 
• Reform aid architecture: volumes and effectiveness 
• Address global imbalances 
Source: Naudé (2009), cited in Fosu and Naude (2009). 
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5.4. Pitfalls in Policy Responses 
 The policy responses of the Nigerian authorities have not been too 
popular among its citizenry. Much effort to mobilise public support is required. 
However, pitfalls in the various policy responses must be checked. Some are 
enumerated in this subsection. 
 The attempt being made to remove fuel subsidy must be treated 
withsome caution, given that it is an exclusive policy that narrows the safety net 
of poor people. 
 Generation of another debt trap as experienced in the 1990s should be 
avoided. This is because the current crisis is likely to put pressure on the 
country’s expenditures (given the global calls for fiscal expansion). 
 The gains made in the last two years before the crisis should be 
sustained as reversing them could be detrimental. Attempts made to privatise 
some state owned corporations like  Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and 
Power Holding Plc. should be re-visited. These corporations suffer from 
suboptimal inter-temporal resource allocation syndrome and their continued state 
ownership is detrimental to long-term development of the country. 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 Nigeria no doubt is at risk from the global economic crisis. Its GDP 
growth rate target between 7% and 9% for 2009 has been slashed from 6% to 4%. 
Exports mainly crude oil and gas has shrunk due to declining commodity price 
and disruptive activities of militants. The exchange rate has also depreciated from 
N117/$1 to N135 per US dollar at end-December 2008 and currently exchanges 
for N152.6 to the US dollar. The consequences are unpalatable and scorching. 
Fall in real incomes is on the increase, crime rate is rising as kidnappings of 
innocent Nigerians have increased. There is widespread malnutrition and food 
insecurity that may not be far fetched from corruption in high places. The country 
has moved back to the years of two-digit inflation. Other than militant activities 
in the Niger Delta, some new disturbances have been recorded (Boro Haram) in 
the North of Nigeria. 
 Recovery from the recession is not insurmountable. A ‘syndrome-free’ 
recovery is recommended as it has the advantage of overcoming the pitfalls of 
policy responses and improved governance. Sequel to ‘syndrome-free’ recovery 
strategy, there is the need to diversify the Nigerian economy away from its 
monoculture oil and gas dependence. Efforts to boost agricultural output; 
minimise expansionary fiscal and monetary policies on inflation are advocated. 
The current peace move and promises to develop the Niger Delta must be a 
sustainable action. Robust policies at overcoming the electricity power supply 
failure and promotion of a knowledge driven economy is canvassed. 
 
 




1. Excessive leverage is the use of a far larger proportion of borrowed 
funds or others’ money relative to one’s own in undertaking risky 
business. 
2. Counter-cyclicality implied the need to tighten regulation when the 
economy was experiencing an excessive exuberance and relaxing it 
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  Figure 5    Figure 2 
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Note: * Indicates estimated value based on the amount of margin loan swept by 
 the crash in the capital market. The total margin loan (N1 trillion), 
 represents 20% of total credit.  If the crisis continues, most of the loans  
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NIGERIJA I GLOBALNA GOSPODARSKA KRIZA  
 
Sažetak 
Nafta zagađuje sve u južnoj Nigeriji. Istječe iz cjevovoda i zagađuje tlo i vodu. 
Zbog nafte su političarima i generalima koji prisvajaju profit prljave ruke. Nafta 
kvari ambicije mladih ljudi koji će učiniti sve da pridobiju dio tekućeg bogatstva 
– pucaće, sabotirati cjevovode, i otimati strance.   
Klučne riječi: Nigerija, globalna gospodarska kriza 
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